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Abstract
The study of the evolution of cooperative behaviours –which provide benefits to others– and altruism
–which provides benefits to others at a cost to oneself– has been on the core of the evolutionary game
theoretical framework since its foundation. The fast development of the theory during the last years has
improved our knowledge of the issue, but carried attached a diversification of concepts which affected
communication between scientists. Furthermore, the main root of conflict in the struggle for life identified
by Darwin, the limited amount of resources present in any ecosystem, which is assumed to keep a constant
population size in most game theoretical studies, has only recently been taken into account as explicitly
influencing the evolutionary process. This review concerns about both issues, the conceptual diversification
during the last years and the new results of the resource dependent models. In extenso: After a historical
introduction, a review of the most important concepts is carried out. Then it is shown that pairwise
interactions and additive fitness determine prisoner’s dilemmas (PDs) or harmony games, that two altruists
interacting together may determine a PD, and that the interaction environment of the most cooperative and
less selfish individual in any population is always a PD. After that, it is shown that in addition to altruists
versus free-riders, the combination of free-riders and parasites determines a fundamentally different PD.
Computer simulations are then carried out to show that random exploration of parasitism, free-riding and
altruism enables coexistence of the three strategies without the need of reciprocating, punishing or rewarding
strategies. To finish, the problem of the limitation of resources is reviewed, showing that trade-offs between
rate and yield in resources use do not allow for coexistence of cooperative and defective strategies in well-
mixed situations, but that a certain feedback effect between resources use and parasitic benefits may allow
for it, which represents an exception –the first one reported to my knowledge– to the competitive exclusion
principle.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Evolution and natural selection
The publication in 1859 of the book On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the
Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life by Charles Darwin [1] marked the end of an old
era dominated by religious beliefs in which the human being –specially the occidental human being– was
in the middle of the universe of creation. The idea of evolution, independently found by Wallace and
Darwin himself at a time in which scientific circles questioned creationist theories, laid the foundations for
scientific proof of the revolutionary ideas: man, as well as any other living organism, is the product of a
long evolutionary process involving small changes and selection.
The first ideas related to evolutionary processes root on the late 1700’s and early 1800’s lively debate
on the formation and shaping of the earth, where some geologists, as James Hutton and Charles Lyell
[2–5], proposed that very slow long term processes of microscopic change driven by natural forces, as wind
and water flow frictions or temperature changes, where the actual cause for the observed earth structure
(Hutton [3] and Lyell [5], specially the first, already suggested the applicability of such ideas to the study of
biological processes). Johann W. Goethe [6] also noticed that, given the morphological similarities between
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all plants, they might have developed by metamorphosis from an equal original form or ur-plant. In this
context, Jean-Baptiste Lamarck made the first proposal of a biological evolutionary process giving rise to
new species [7].
At the same time as the evolutionary geology debate was held, economist T. Malthus ideas on population
growth, overuse and competition for resources spread, reaching Wallace and Darwin. Malthus argued that
any increase in available resources in society would lead to a subsequent increase in the population, until
the same original subsistence per-capita amount of resources was reached [8]. Darwin and Wallace thought
that, if this was to happen in human societies in which individuals may restrain their own reproductive and
consumption rates, it would happen still more intensely in nature, where animals were thought not to do
so, neither to have the ability to increase their resource supply.
The application of geological and economic born ideas, together with the competition triggered by the
finiteness of resources, led Darwin and Wallace to the conception of the evolutionary process in which
individuals reproduce and give birth to similar –but not equal– offspring, and natural selection allows for
the survival and spread of the best adapted traits, those associated to the fittest individuals, understood as
the most successful from a reproductive and survival perspective.
However, Darwin himself realised the paradox implicit in natural selection acting at the individual level:
any living being exploiting others would have a net evolutionary advantage over those individuals which
assume some reproductive cost in order to produce a benefit on the rest; thus, the evolution of cooperative
and altruistic behaviours seems to be doomed, which led to the imposition of the most dramatic view of
the struggle for life in some scientific circles [9] in the late 1800’s and early 1900’s, and to the denial of the
existence of cooperative benefits from an evolutionary perspective.
The evolution of cooperative behaviours was analysed from an opposed point of view in 1902 by Piotr
Kropotkin in his book Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution [10], where he gathered a collection of articles in
which he showed that cooperation, present both in animals and humans, is an important factor to take into
account from an evolutionary perspective. He did not neglect natural selection, but argued that the struggle
against an inclement nature favoured the evolution of mutual aid instead of fight between con-specifics.
Despite some experimental results showing the benefits of group formation against under-crowding in
unfavourable environments [11], the debate continued, with supporters on both sides. It would still take
another seventy years for theoreticians to develop a theory consistent with the observed results, and able to
account for the evolution of cooperation.
1.2. Genes, populations, relatedness and assortment
At the time Wallace and Darwin proposed the theory of natural selection it was still unknown how
heredity of traits between parents and offspring was realised. The works on heredity of Mendel, published in
1866, remained unknown until the beginning of the 1900’s, when three European scientists –Hugo de Vries,
Carl Correns, and Erich von Tschermak– found similar results and rediscovered it. They found experimental
results proving the transmission of discrete traits between parents and offspring, and a few years later the
term gene was coined.
Even when the discovery of the DNA as carrier of the genetic information should still wait until the
1940’s, the knowledge of the existence of such inherited information as discrete traits allowed theoreticians
–S.Wright, R. A. Fisher and J.B.S. Haldane [12–14]– during the 1920’s and 1930’s to develop a mathematical
framework for the evolution of gene frequencies and their associated traits within populations, in what is
now called population genetics.
In this context, the importance of relatedness as a measurement of genetic similarity came into attention
as a possible factor allowing for the evolution of altruistic sacrifice, as illustrated by J.B.S. Haldane statement
that he would not risk his life for saving a drowning brother, but he would do it for two brothers or eight
cousins. This intuitive statement was formalised mathematically in 1964, when W.D.Hamilton published
his seminal works on kin selection [15, 16], founding the inclusive fitness theory.
Inclusive fitness theory is based on the assumption that, although selection is carried out at an individual
level, it is the genes which are actually selected, and equal genes are indistinguishable from an evolutionary
perspective. Thus, the fitness of a behavioural trait, which is a measurement of its reproductive value and
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directly related to the number of offspring it will produce, is not only that of the trait in the individual,
but also the addition of the effects of its behaviour on the fitness of all other individuals carrying such
trait. Furthermore, it is usually assumed that evolution acts so as to maximise the inclusive fitness of the
individuals.
With the previous assumptions applied to identical genes by descent, i.e. genes which are a perfect
replica of those of a common ancestor, Hamilton proved that altruistic traits which imply a cost −c < 0 to
the actor might evolve whenever the benefit b > 0 of the altruistic behaviour is directed towards individuals
whose relatedness r –a measurement of genetic similarity– fulfils the so called Hamilton rule
r >
c
b
, (1)
situation in which the inclusive fitness effects of the costly action to the altruistic donor trait are outweighed
by the benefits accrued on similar-enough individuals (see [17] for a detailed explanation of the meaning of
r).
This results were expanded in 1970 by G.R. Price [18]. He proved that, if the fitness of the individuals
carrying a trait i of value zi at time t is given by wi = w¯q
′
i/qi, where qi, q
′
i are the frequencies of individuals
carrying such trait at times t and t′ = t+ 1, and w¯ is the mean population fitness, then the variation of the
mean value of such trait ∆z¯ = z¯′ − z¯ fulfils
w¯∆z¯ = Cov(wi, zi) + E(wi∆zi), (2)
where Cov(wi, zi) = E(wizi) − E(wi)E(zi) is the covariance between fitness and trait value, and E(X) is
the expected value of X .
The Price equation applied to the evolution of altruistic behaviours results in the Hamilton’s rule, but
its interpretation changes. The fundamental feature which allows for the evolution of altruism is no longer
genetic relatedness, but the assortment between altruistic behaviours [19], i.e. the fact that enough benefits
given by altruists are enjoyed by other altruists. It is interesting to note that the Price equation is derived
from simple mathematical arguments, for which reason it is always a valid equation in any system in which
standard mathematics apply, but as some authors argue, this generality deriving from its mathematical
truth makes this equation content empty: It does not say anything else about the real world which is not
already implicit in the structure of mathematical statistics.
1.3. The mathematics of games, or how to model behaviours
The origin of game theory dates back to the 1920’s, when John von Neumann published a series of
articles on the issue, and the latter book The Theory of Games and Economic behaviour in collaboration
with Oskar Morgenstern. Its development continued during the rest of the century, attracting initially the
attention of economists and politicians.
Game theory focuses on the study of cooperation and conflict between rational decision makers interacting
together, i.e. individuals who possess information about the possible outcomes of the interactions (the game)
and decide how to act according to it. The specification of a behaviour of an individual in any situation
is called strategy, and the outcome of every interaction depends on the strategies chosen by all interacting
individuals (players). The main goal of game theory is to predict which strategies will be played by each
player and the associated distribution of benefits, for which reason John Forbes Nash introduced in 1951 the
concept later called Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium happens whenever none of the players increases
its benefits by changing its actual strategy. In this way, if one assumes that individuals are rational, the
Nash equilibrium represents the outcome of the interaction.
Full rationality was initially assumed in game theoretical models. This means that individuals are
rational, and take into account that their interacting partners are rational as well. This assumption is often
unrealistic, on the one side because information might not be fully available or costly to acquire, and on the
other side because it leads to an infinite iteration of the form I know that you know that I know that you
know..., for which reason the concept of bounded rationality was introduced into economic game theory.
Bounded rational individuals do not possess any longer all the information of the system, or cannot
process it, and their behaviour is influenced only by a few variables related to the situation. This point of
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view seems more appropriate to describe the real world, in which animals (including humans) neither have
infinite perception of the reality surrounding them, nor –often– the time to process all important information
before interacting. And this is specially important in a situation in which life, reproduction and death come
into play.
All previous concerns illustrate the necessity of a dynamic framework in which to embed the game
theoretical analysis (this was already suggested by Nash in his doctoral thesis), which led to the birth of
evolutionary game theory.
1.4. Evolutionary game theory versus inclusive fitness theory: modelling behavioural evolution.
In 1973 J. Maynard-Smith and G.R. Price published a paper in which they reinterpreted the payoffs of
the game as fitness changes of the individuals, and thus in their reproductive capacity. The static view of
game theory was transformed into a dynamic framework, and the Nash equilibrium concept was changed
for that of evolutionary stability, to refer to those populations which, once established, cannot be invaded
by just a few mutant individuals [20, 21]. In this way, the branch of biology called evolutionary game theory
was born.
In the following years the replicator equation,
dxi
dt
= xi(fi − f¯), (3)
became the main tool for analysing the dynamics resulting from the evolutionary processes [22, 23]. In this
equation xi is the fraction of individuals following strategy i, fi is their fitness and f¯ the mean population
fitness. This equation describes the frequency-dependent dynamics of infinite –or very big– populations of
replicating individuals, i.e. the dynamics in a fitness landscape which depends on the population composi-
tion. On its mutation regarding version, the so called replicator-mutator equation has been proposed as a
dynamical equation describing the entire evolutionary process of reproduction, mutation and selection.
The replicator equation is easily connected with ecological models via the Lotka-Volterra equations [24].
In particular, it has been proven that there is a transformation between the variables of the Lotka-Volterra
equation for n − 1 species and the replicator equation for n phenotypes which results in the same orbits
[24]. The replicator equation has also been proven to be equivalent to the Price equation if one assumes
that the traits involved in the latter are indicator functions which take value 1 for equality of two indices
and 0 otherwise, and that the average of a trait remains constant in the absence of selection [25].
The debate on the most fundamental approach to formulate mathematical models of evolution (evolu-
tionary game theory versus inclusive fitness theory) has returned to be a hot topic during the last years
[26–42]. Although recent studies argue or show that both disciplines provide the same results in some sit-
uations [43, 44], this has not been proven in a broader scope, and it has been recently suggested that they
are indeed fundamentally different [25, 42]. One of the main differences is that the Price equation is not
always dynamically sufficient, i.e. cannot be used to predict all variables in future temporal steps knowing
the previous state of the system, and thus to calculate trajectories in the phase space, which suggests that
the evolutionary game theoretical framework might be more appropriate whenever we want to describe the
dynamics of the system in detail and calculate associated quantities, as fixation probabilities or invasion
times [25]. Furthermore, the evolutionary game theoretical framework intrinsically concerns about frequency
dependent selection [45], i.e. situations where the evolutionary process depends on the strategy frequencies
present in the population, and allows for a general treatment for any intensity of selection [46].
It is worth to remark the difference between the assumption of weak selection in both frameworks: While
this assumption in game theory refers to the “importance” (influence) of the game (interaction structure)
in the reproductive capacity of the individuals, in inclusive fitness it usually refers to a very small difference
between the behaviours involved in the evolutionary process; the latter assumption usually leads to the
neglection of non-linear terms and induces an underlying mathematical structure which have been argued to
constrain the ability to represent mathematically the evolutionary process [25, 47]. While this may be the
right representation for most genetically related evolutionary systems –which assume that mutations lead
mostly to small phenotypic changes–, it may fail for social evolution (see [25] for a detailed discussion).
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In the last two decades the evolutionary game theoretical framework has been expanded to cover a much
broader range of situations. In addition to the study of evolution in nature, culture and society have been
regarded from an evolutionary perspective. In cultural evolution and social learning contexts, strategies are
no longer linked to genes, and the reproduction and death process are reinterpreted as a change of strategy
during the lifetime of the individual. Furthermore, new microscopic update rules have been introduced to
represent specific learning methods and reproduction-death processes, broadening the range of applications
to include sociological and psychological research. However, with the development and expansion of the
game theoretical framework, evolution has acted upon some of the key concepts that initially originated it.
In this review, I first focus on these key concepts, trying to unify different nowadays perspectives, and using
them to illustrate some interesting situations; then I review and summarize present results that go back to
the original problem pointed out by Malthus and Darwin as one of the origins of competition in nature: the
limited amount of resources present in our world.
2. Definitions and methods
2.1. Relative definitions of cooperative and selfish behaviours, a general framework for cooperation: Disen-
tangling selfishness and cooperativeness.
The different definitions of cooperation and altruism used by scientists have sometimes led to misun-
derstandings, affecting communication between them and knowledge transfer. A recent attempt to start
a debate on the use of such concepts seems to have left things unchanged [48–50], with an unclear defi-
nition of the concepts, or even worst, with a multiplicity of definitions which use the same words to refer
to different things. In what follows some simple definitions are given, which relate to classical definitions
and clarify some common misunderstandings between scientists, as those deriving from the mix of group
versus individual behaviour, of the use of different time frameworks or of the assumption that selfishness
and cooperativeness are correlated (some of the misunderstandings are analysed in section 2.1.1).
The concept of cooperation, rather than a fixed concept that allows for a clear definition of what co-
operative individuals are, is a contextual dependent concept, as strategies can be defined as cooperative or
not only in relation to other strategies involved in the evolutionary process [51, 52] (this is expanded with
examples in section 3). This suggests that, instead of trying to define strategies as cooperative or defective,
a gradual definition for cooperation might be established according to the following two principles:
• A strategy A is more cooperative than another one B whenever it is more beneficial to interact with A
than with B from a receiver’s point of view.
• A cooperative act does not reduce the fitness of the recipient of the act.
The first principle to define a cooperative behaviour or act is purely relative, as it is based on the
perception of benefits of one individual when interacting with others, while the second one may have a
relative or an absolute character depending on the choice of the reference system on an absolute or a relative
basis (the discussion of this point is expanded in section 2.1.2). In this way, if two individuals which are
regarded as cooperative according to these two principles interact together, the interaction is a cooperative
act. Furthermore, the principles just given to define an act as cooperative are completely consistent with
the general definition of cooperation, which might be stated as follows:
• Cooperation is the non-forced action or process of working together for a common purpose or benefit.
Remember that the referred benefits in a biological or social context are usually quantified as fitness, i.e.
as a measure of the reproductive capacity of the individual or the behavioural trait.
Let me remark that in order to define a behaviour as cooperative according to the previous principles one
has to look at the effect of such behaviour on the co-player, and not on oneself: Self-benefits are important
for the definition of selfishness, not of cooperativeness. In analogy with the concept of selfishness, a relative
definition for the concept of selfish behaviour may be stated as:
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• A strategy A is more selfish than another one B whenever it is more beneficial to act following strategy
A than B from an actor’s point of view.
• A selfish act increases the fitness of the the actor.
And the general definition of selfishness as:
• Selfishness is the quality of individuals which concern excessively or exclusively with oneself, seeking
or concentrating on one’s own advantage, pleasure, or well-being without regard for others.
As before, the first principle to define a behaviour as selfish is purely relative, based on the perception
of benefits of the actor following two different strategies, while the second one may have a relative or an
absolute character depending on the choice of the origin of the reference system. Now, complete classification
of strategies can be done following the definitions of cooperative and selfish behaviours (Fig. 1). Note that
this classification includes cooperative behaviours which are also (at least to some extent) selfish, as the
cooperator gets a self-benefit for cooperating; this behaviours, which are usually called mutually beneficial
or mutualistic, include weak altruism, which might be regarded as selfish cooperation, but in which the net
benefit of the cooperator is less than the net benefit of the co-player, i.e. in which the individual is more
cooperative than selfish (see [53] for a nice review of the concepts of weak and strong altruism in groups. In
the following altruism refers to strong altruism).
In summary, cooperativeness refers to fitness variations in co-player, requiring for absolute cooperation
such effects to be non-negative when compared to the neutral case, i.e. the null point of the reference system
(Fig. 1). In the same way, relative selfishness refers to fitness variations in oneself, with the requirement for
absolute selfishness of such effects to be positive when compared to the null point of the reference system.
In this way, cooperativeness and selfishness are different features of a behaviour, not necessarily dependent
on each other. Note however that absolute cooperativeness and selfishness are not absolute in the sense of
applicable for any framework, but within the selected framework, which in most cases is a relative framework
which uses an individual behaviour, or the mean population fitness, as origin of the reference system. The
discussion on the choice of the framework is expanded in section 2.1.2.
2.1.1. Remarks on the definitions and common misunderstandings
The second requirement for a cooperative behaviour states that the benefits of cooperation must be at
least the absence of fitness losses due to aggressions, and from this ground, any positive benefit, as those
created by altruists; a slightly more stringent definition requires positive effects (even if infinitesimal) on the
partner [49]. However, the definitions given above account for peace as a social good [54], and thus conflict-
avoiding, pacific and pacifist behaviours as cooperative. Note that, although when compared with altruism,
free-riding strategies (neutral individuals) are regarded as defective, as they receive the altruistic benefits
at no cost, the cost paid by altruists is not a consequence of the free-riding strategy, but of the altruistic
behaviour itself; furthermore, as I will show in section 3.6, in a context in which there exist aggressive,
parasitic strategies, the existence of free-riders and altruists allows for their survival, preventing the sure
extinction of any of those strategies when interacting with parasites in well-mixed populations, i.e. in the
mean field limit in which every individual interacts with any other with equal probability.
Note also that the previous definitions may apply to cooperation in the short-term, i.e. interaction after
interaction, as well as in the medium term (the result of a certain number of interactions) and in the long
term (lifetime consequences of the behaviour [48]), but that such time frame should always be specified
[55, 56], as strategies which are regarded as non-selfish and cooperative (altruistic) in the short term may
turn to be selfish in the long term. As an example of the misunderstandings that may arise due to the
lack of specification of the temporal framework, let us analyse the discussion on the the so called reciprocal
altruism [57].
Altruism is a behaviour which incurs costs to the actor in order to produce benefits in the recipient of
the act, being a purely cooperative and non-selfish behaviour. However, according to the definitions above,
some acts that might be seen as altruistic in the short term may turn to be mutually beneficial in the long
term, as it happens for behaviours that reciprocate altruistic acts [57, 58]: they might be called mutually
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beneficial (selfishly cooperative) in the long term, but altruistic (non-selfish and cooperative) in the short,
whenever individuals have no information and cannot predict the outcome of the next interaction. Thus, the
discussion on whether reciprocal altruism is actual altruism or not was triggered by a choice of different time
frames, not of different concepts: those who see it as altruism were looking to the short term, while those
considering it a selfish strategy where looking to the lifetime consequences. Note however that independently
of the time frame chosen, reciprocal altruistic behaviours are always regarded as cooperative according to
the definitions, being the difference their degree of selfishness, which changes from negative (non-selfishness)
to positive with increasing time.
The misunderstanding in the reciprocal altruism debate roots on the mix of two different points of view:
the short term vs. the lifetime consequences. This relates directly with two of the major problems in
biology, as expressed by N. Tinbergen in 1963 [59]: the causation and the survival value problems (see also
[60] and the discussion in [48]). The causation problem might be colloquially said to relate to proximate
explanations, or to answer “how” questions, while the survival value may be related with “why” questions,
or ultimate explanations. In this way, the altruistic reciprocating behaviour is the answer to how an animal
may behave in order to promote cooperation in the short term. Why such behaviour evolves is because it
produces enough assortment so as to be promoted by evolution on the long term, but this can only be stated
after the entire life history of the altruistic behavioural trait is taken into account.
Other mistake found in the literature comes from assuming that altruism and selfishness are different
degrees of the same function. In this way, parasitic behaviours have been called selfish behaviours [48]. It
is true that parasitism is the paradigmatic example of a selfish non-cooperative behaviour. However, as it
has been shown before, selfishness and cooperativeness are not mutually exclusive (Fig.1) and it is perfectly
possible to have selfish strategies that produce some benefit in the co-player, and are thus cooperative. For
this reason, identifying selfishness with parasitism restricts the broader scope of what selfishness is and
should be avoided.
Further mistakes come from the confusion of the concept of cooperation at the individual level, i.e.
cooperative behaviour, and cooperation as a collective action –the broader definition. This confusion, which
was already pointed out by Dugatkin in 1997 [49, 52] is however not cleared in some later papers [48].
Some authors have also tried to relate the definitions of altruism and cooperation with the evolutionary
consequences of such behaviours [48, 55], and more specifically, by the way they are selected for. However,
such definitions fail whenever a behaviour is counter selected, and may induce further confusion allowing
for situations in which altruism and cooperation seem exclusive from each other (see appendix Appendix B
for a short summary of definitions in the literature).
To finish, let us note that, as pointed out by some authors [61], even if intentionally directed towards
cooperation, cooperative behaviours may fail to produce the expected benefits. In this case, the long term
behaviour, influenced by the probability of success, can be used to define it as cooperative or not. Note that
with this extension of the definition, acts that cannot reduce other individuals fitness are always regarded
as cooperative, even if they always fail to provide the expected benefits.
Further discussion about the intentionality and non-intentionality of the cooperative behaviours and its
relationship with the emergence of ecosystems can be found in appendinx Appendix B.2.
2.1.2. Discussion on the null point of the reference system
Along the text the prisoner’s dilemma (PD, explained in the next section) will be extensively used
to illustrate the cases of cooperation by restraining from conflict (free-riders versus parasitism), and that
of social goods formed by cooperation (altruism versus free-riding). However, it is good to remark that
both situations, which are comprised in the definition of cooperation provided at the beginning, are relative
situations, as they refer to fitness changes in reference to a certain behaviour which determines the null point.
In the PD examples along the text, the reference used will be a passive, neutral individual, called free-rider,
as it produces no fitness variations on others, nor on itself, but receives the actions of the co-players.
Whenever the null point is determined by a passive behaviour, it can be easily used as null point or
origin of the reference system, as the one in figure 1. However, it might not be always easy (maybe not even
possible) to find such reference points in other situations, specially whenever all individuals are active, e.g.
situations in which all individuals are reproducing. In this case individuals refraining from reproduction
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Figure 1: Classification of strategies in the case of direct interactions as a function of the direct fitness effect of the action on
the actor itself and on the recipient. The arrow on the right shows the increase in cooperativeness; the increase in selfishness
is shown by the lower arrow. According to the definition, only non-damaging strategies (upper quadrants including the x-axis)
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(free-riders) determine the null point, altruism is non-selfish cooperation, mutualism is selfish cooperation, spite is non-selfish
and damaging, and parasites are selfish non-cooperative individuals. The combination of any two of these strategies determines
either a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) or a Harmony Game (HG), as shown in section 3.1.
reduce their own reproductive fitness and increase that of others, being thus altruists, while those that
increase their reproductive rate and decrease the fitness of others would be parasites. However, as in this
case all individuals are actively reproducing, it may happen that no fixed baseline fitness can be measured as
a neutral reference. In such cases two possibilities appear: first, choosing a constant arbitrary reference for
the origin of the behavioural reference system; second, using the mean population fitness (or other variable)
as reference. The latter case seems to be a very opportune choice, as the replicator equation (analysed in
Sec. 2.3.2), which is usually assumed to describe the system’s dynamics in evolutionary game theoretical
studies, depends on the difference of the individual and the mean population fitness. In this special case
the reference system (Fig. 1) would have a time dependent origin, and thus cooperativeness and selfishness
degrees would not only be relative, but also time dependent.
2.2. Non-cooperative symmetric games
In evolutionary game theory the essence of the interactions between individuals is captured in a payoff
matrix, where each entry represents the outcome of the interaction between a focal individual behavioural
type (rows) and the interaction partner behavioural type (columns) (this refers to normal form games; see
[62] for extensive game respresentations). A general payoff matrix for non-cooperative symmetric games
between two strategies, A and B, may be written as
A B
A R S
B T P
(4)
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and depending on the parameters, four different kinds of non-cooperative games are defined, where the
cooperative behaviour is only promoted whenever it is the most selfish behaviour (this will be explained in
deep later). If we assume that behaviour A is the cooperative behaviour, the four possible games are the
prisoner’s dilemma (PD), the snowdrift (SD) or chicken game, the stag hunt (SH) game and the harmony
(HG) game.
The prisoner’s dilemma is named after the dilemma in which two prisoners are asked to incriminate the
other as participant in a robbery. If both individuals incriminate each other, each one spends 3 years in
prison. If only one of them incriminates the other, they spend respectively 0 and 5 years in prison. If none of
them denounces the other, both spend 1 year in prison. Thus, it is better for them if none incriminates the
other (both cooperate), and both get free after 1 year, than if both testify against the other (both defect)
and spend 3 years in jail. However, rational behaviour leads to mutual defection, as from a self-maximising
point of view it is always better to incriminate: if the other one does not, incriminating is worth freedom
instead of 1 year in prison; if the other one incriminates you, incriminating reduces in two years the time in
prison, from 5 to 3 years. The general payoff ordering in Eq. 4 for a PD is T > R > P > S (note that, as
spending time in prison is bad, the payoffs should be taken as negative, i.e. 0, -1, -3, -5).
The snowdrift or chicken game is named after two different situations which result in the same payoff
ordering: T > R > S > P . The snowdrift refers to a situation in which two drivers are stuck in the middle of
a snowdrift in the morning. They can both cooperate to shovel the snow (thus sharing the working efforts)
and get home for lunch. If both decide to defect, however, they will have to wait until the afternoon for
the sun to melt the snow, and they will arrive home for dinner. If just one of them decides to shovel the
snow, they will arrive home after lunch, but the individual cooperating is the only one paying the cost of
working. The chicken game refers to a situation in which two drivers drive towards each other, and the
one that lasts longer without changing direction wins a prize. If both of them change direction, the prize is
shared and none gets hurt. If none of them changes direction, they crash, break their cars, and get injured.
The structure of the payoff ordering in this case determines that the best option is to do the opposite of
the co-player: If the other one does not cooperate, you should, thus avoiding getting stuck in the snow until
dinner, or involved in a car accident; if the co-player cooperates, it is better not to cooperate, in order to
save the effort of shovelling the snow, or to win the entire prize.
The stag hunt refers to a situation in which two individuals go hunting together. They can choose between
cooperating to hunt a stag, which requires coordinated work and long time waiting, or going each one on
their own to hunt rabbits, which is a less worthy prize, but easier to do. The SH game is a coordination
game, as the best option is doing the same as the co-player. If both cooperate, they get the stag and the
highest possible reward, while if they go hunting for rabbits, they both get a lower reward. However, if one
of them goes hunting a stag and the other one goes hunting for rabbits, the first one will not get the stag,
while the second one will hunt more rabbits as he will keep all of them instead of sharing with the co-player.
The payoff ordering determined by the SH situation is R > T > P > S.
The harmony game represents a situation in which cooperating is the best outcome, as it maximizes
instant payoffs from an individual point of view. In this case the payoff ordering is R > T > S > P , and
thus, irrespective of the co-players strategy, cooperating increases ones own payoff (from P to S if the co-
player defects, from T to R if the co-player cooperates). Thus, this situation does not represent a dilemma
for the evolution of cooperation.
2.3. Evolutionary dynamics
2.3.1. Invariances of the dynamics
If the evolutionary dynamics depend on payoff differences between strategies, or between strategies and
mean population payoff, as for the replicator equation (3), or other updating rules [63–65], the dynamics
is invariant under the addition of a constant to any column in the payoff matrix. Let us prove it for the
general case of N different strategies.
For payoff differences between two strategies, writingMij for the element in row i, column j of the payoff
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matrix, i.e. the payoff of strategy i interacting with j)
pii − pij =
N∑
k=1
xkMik −
N∑
k=1
xkMjk =
N∑
k=1
xk(Mik −Mjk) (5)
and as the difference in the last term is for payoffs in the same column, i.e. column k, the addition of any
constant to the entire column leaves the result invariant.
For dynamics ruled by the difference of strategies payoff and the mean population payoff,
pii − pi =
N∑
k=1
xkMik −
N∑
j=1
xj(
N∑
k=1
xkMjk) (6)
then, if one adds a constant t to all payoffs in columnm, one gets an extra term xmt from the first summation,
and −
∑N
j=1 xj(xmt) = −xmt from the second one; both vanish as they have different sign.
2.3.2. Dynamical outcomes of the replicator dynamics for two-strategy symmetric games
The prisoner’s dilemma (PD) is one of the four possible two-player, two-strategy symmetric games. In
the PD the payoff ordering is T > R > P > S (see equation (11)). As it has been discussed, this makes
defection more beneficial from a self-maximising point of view in any interaction. The other three games
are the snowdrift (SD) game, corresponding to T > R > S > P , the stag hunt (SH) game, corresponding to
R > T > P > S, and the harmony game (HG), where R > T > S > P . In the following, I make use of the
replicator equation (3) to show the dynamical outcomes of the four games, and how the PD represents the
most difficult case for the evolution of altruism in large, well-mixed populations (mean field limit in which
every individual interacts with any other with equal probability).
The replicator equation (3) depends on the difference between the mean payoff of the strategy and the
mean population payoff. Therefore, as shown in section 2.3.1, the addition of a constant to any column of
the payoff matrix leaves the dynamics invariant. The payoff matrix for two strategies may thus be written
(subtracting the diagonal term in each column) as
A B
A 0 a
B b 0
(7)
where a = S − P and b = T −R in the terminology of equation (4).
Since the fractions of strategies add up to one, xa + xb = 1, the entire dynamics may be expressed with
just one differential equation, let us say that for x ≡ xa:
dx
dt
= x˙ = x(1− x)[a− (a+ b)x] (8)
In this case factor a corresponds to the per-capita growth rate of strategy A when rare, i.e.
a = lim
x→0
x˙
x
=
dx˙
dx
∣∣∣∣
x=0
(9)
It can be proven in a similar way that b is the per-capita growth of strategy B when rare in the population.
These two factors are important as we may assure if a strategy is evolutionarily stable, i.e. resistant to
invasion by a small fraction of mutants, just by looking to them; if the per-capita growth rate of the invader
strategy is not positive, it will not increase its presence in the population.
Generally, there will be three solutions for equation (8) with parameters a, b 6= 0. Two of them represent
always valid solutions, i.e. x = 0 and x = 1. The third one
x∗ =
a
a+ b
(10)
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represents a valid solution only when it takes values x∗ ∈ [0, 1], and it may be a stable or unstable fixed
point.
The outcomes of the dynamics are summarised as follows:
i. Neutral stability. If a = b = 0 every point in [0, 1] is a rest point. In this case there is no evolution and
the fraction of individuals x remains constant in time.
r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r
ii. Dominance of one strategy. If ab ≤ 0 and at least one of the factors a and b is not 0, then x∗ /∈ (0, 1),
and the dynamics will lead either to x = 0 or to x = 1 depending on the sign of x˙. This is what happens
in prisoner’s dilemmas (PD, defection dominates) and harmony games (HG, cooperation dominates).
❜ ✲ r
iii. Bistability. If ab > 0 and a, b < 0 then x∗ is an unstable rest point and the dynamics will lead either to
x = 0 or to x = 1 if the initial fraction of individuals is below or above x∗ respectively. This is what
happens in stag hunt (SH) games.
r ✛ ❜ ✲ r
iv. Coexistence. If ab > 0 and a, b > 0 then x∗ is a stable attractor, and whenever the initial composition
contains a mixture of individuals, the dynamics will lead to stable coexistence of strategies in proportions
x∗ for A and 1− x∗ for B. This is what happens in snowdrift (SD) games.
❜ ✲ r ✛ ❜
Thus, in this case in which the replicator dynamics describe the evolution of the system (most dynamics
behave in a similar way in the mean field limit), the PD –and the public goods game (PGG) with strong
altruism as its n-players generalisation (see [66, 67] for two ways to map PGG’s into two-player games)–
is the most difficult case for the evolution of cooperation, as the evolutionary outcome is dominance of
defection.
3. The prisoner’s dilemma: Altruism versus free-riding and beyond
The PD game has been widely used as a mathematical metaphor representing the problem of the evolution
of altruism and cooperation during the last 20 years. However, its study by theoretical scientists has been
surrounded by controversy since the very beginning, as some scientists claim that other games, as the
snowdrift, in which coexistence is the evolutionary outcome (see section 2.3.2), are more appropriate to
represent real interactions. The controversy has not yet been solved, as difficulties arise when trying to
measure payoffs in nature, which usually does not allow to assess if the payoff ordering is that of a PD or
of a snowdrift [68–71]. I show in section 3.1 below a special feature that allows for a clarification of this
problem in some contexts: If individual behaviours produce a fixed fitness variation on the actor, a fixed
fitness variation on the receiver of the act, and fitness is additive, only PD structures or harmony games
emerge, being cooperation the non-trivial solution only for the PD. However, I also show a limitation of the
PD: the widely spread belief that any PD structure of the interactions involves altruists and non-altruists
is wrong. As I show in sec.3.2, two altruists interacting together may also define a PD, in which they differ
in their cooperativeness degree.
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3.1. Direct interactions and additive payoffs lead either to prisoner’s dilemmas or to harmony games
Suppose that in a habitat there are two interacting species, or in a population two different behavioural
types; let’s call them A and B. Suppose also that during an interaction individual A produces a fitness
change As on itself and Ar on the recipient, and B produces Bs and Br on itself and on the co-player
respectively. The interaction matrix is
A B
A R = As +Ar S = As +Br
B T = Bs +Ar P = Bs +Br
(11)
Let us assume in the following that individual A is the cooperative individual, and B the non-cooperative
one, also called defector. Then, the first requirement in the definition of cooperative behaviours (see sec-
tion 2.1) –it is better to interact with the most cooperative individual– turns into T,R > P, S, and the
second requirement –absolute cooperative individuals do not reduce the recipient’s fitness– into Ar ≥ 0.
Defining ∆s = As−Bs (relative selfishness degree of A), and ∆r = Ar−Br (relative cooperativeness degree
of A), the two requirements for the definition of a behaviour as cooperative reduce to
∆r > Abs(∆s)
Ar ≥ 0.
(12)
The first of equations (12) implies that, for individual A to be a relative cooperator and B a relative
non-cooperator (usually called defector), the relative cooperativeness degree of A must be bigger than the
absolute value of its relative selfishness degree. The second equation requires the action of A on B to have
neutral or positive effects in order to call A an absolute cooperator – note that absolute refers to the chosen
framework. As we will see below in section 3.2, A being an absolute cooperator does not imply that B is a
non-cooperator; they may perfectly be both absolute cooperators, and still determine a PD. For that reason,
in the following cooperative and defective individuals should be interpreted according to the relative scale
defined by equations (12).
There are four possible games that are consistent with equations (12) (see section 2.3.2), and thus one
of the interacting individuals is regarded as more cooperative than the other:
Game Payoff ordering → Requirement
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) T ≥ R > P ≥ S → ∆s ≤ 0
Harmony Game (HG) R ≥ T > S ≥ P → ∆s ≥ 0
Snowdrift (SD) T ≥ R > S ≥ P → ∆s = 0
Stag Hunt (SH) R ≥ T > P ≥ S → ∆s = 0
(13)
For a PD, being A the cooperative individual, the relative selfishness degree of A is negative or zero,
i.e. ∆s ≤ 0. This means that it is better to be a defector (relative non-cooperator) than a cooperator; as
As ≤ Bs, changing strategy from A (cooperate) to B (defect) in any interaction increases ones own payoff
in a quantity ∆s, while getting the same payoff from the co-player. Thus, Darwinian selection of the fittest
promotes defection, and as for a PD selfishness is anti-correlated with cooperativeness, evolution leads to
populations of the most selfish individuals, where everyone earns a payoff P , even if populations of relative
cooperative individuals do have a higher mean payoff, R > P . Note that whenever P = 0 we face the so
called tragedy of the commons [72], i.e. the exhaustion of common goods due to selfishness.
If one imposes the payoff ordering for a harmony game, then ∆s ≥ 0, i.e. As ≥ Bs. In this case
cooperativeness is correlated with selfishness, i.e. cooperative individuals (A) are also the more selfish, and
any individual increases its self-payoff in a quantity ∆s in any interaction by changing to cooperate instead of
defecting, independently of the co-player’s strategy. Cooperators are thus favoured by natural selection and
their evolution does not represent a dilemma, as self-maximisation of payoffs equals mean population-payoff
maximisation. This kind of situations, in which selfishness and cooperativeness are (positively) correlated,
are the situations to which Adam Smith referred when he spoke about an invisible hand at work, by which
individuals increase the common good by their selfish motifs [73]. This is however not true for PD’s, when
defection is promoted by natural selection.
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For the snowdrift (SD) and the stag hunt (SH) games, the payoff ordering imposes As = Bs, which means
that, if payoffs are assumed to be additive and interactions direct, both games only exist at the boundary
between PD and HG regions, and might be seen as limit cases of them. It is not possible to have a SD or
SH with fixed additive fitness variations due to direct interactions; only PD and HG structures emerge in
this case, i.e. all possible combinations of behaviours present in Fig. 1 give rise to PD’s or HG’s.
3.2. Cooperative and defective altruists in a prisoner’s dilemma and the paradox of goodness
The payoff ordering in equation (13) implies that whenever there are two altruistic behaviours interacting
together, i.e. As = −ca, Ar = ba, Bs = −cb, Br = bb, and both behaviours fulfil a PD, i.e. ca ≥ cb,
ba ≥ bb + ca − cb, then A is regarded as cooperator and B as defector. This has led to the false and
widely spread belief that PD structures always include absolute cooperative and non-cooperative individuals.
According to the definition of cooperation given in section 2.1 and formalised in equations (12), altruistic
behaviours are always absolute cooperative behaviours when compared to the neutral individuals defining
the origin of the reference system (see Fig. 1), and thus, although one of them is more cooperative and less
selfish than the other, two absolute cooperative behaviours may determine a PD.
Note that this leads to the paradox of goodness: Whenever one individual is the most cooperative and
less selfish in a population, any interaction in which he is involved will be a PD, where he is regarded as
cooperator irrespectively of any other strategies determining HG’s or PD’s. Being this so, for the most
cooperative and less selfish individual, his interaction environment is always a PD in which any other
individual is subject to the selfish temptation to defect when interacting with him, irrespective of being a
fully altruistic population, or any other.
The paradox of goodness represents a strong version of the paradox of cooperation. Cooperation is
promoted in HG’s, when the invisible hand is at work by means of the positive correlation of selfishness and
cooperativeness. However, even in a population in which the invisible hand is at work, goodness (higher
cooperativeness, lower selfishness) is never promoted by natural selection alone. It seems thus necessary
to address the behavioural roots that lead to PD’s, and to find mechanisms that promote goodness. In
section 3.3 I concern about both: I show first that whenever an arbitrary behaviour is used as reference,
two fundamentally different PD’s arise, one in which cooperators increase social goods above the reference
value, and another in which defectors decrease them below zero, and the reference strategy (which may
still be regarded as a free-rider) represents goodness. Then, I review some of the mechanisms that promote
altruism and focus on their capacity to promote goodness.
3.3. Two prisoner’s dilemmas: Altruists, free-riders and parasites.
The PD may represent two different situations, one related to social goods formed by cooperation,
another to social goods created by refraining from conflict [54]. One may prove this using a free-rider
(passive, neutral individual) to define the null point of the reference system (Fig. 1); then, altruists that pay
a cost ca to give a benefit ba > ca to the co-player are more cooperative and less selfish, creating social goods
that increase the mean population fitness at a cost to themselves, while if compared to parasites that pay
a cost cp to parasite a fitness amount bp from the co-player, free-riders are cooperative individuals (relative
and absolute). In this case the social good is the non-competitive environment created by free-riders, while
parasites decrease the mean population fitness. In short:
Altruists: Pay ca, give ba to the co-player.
Free-riders: Receive the action of the co-player.
Parasites: Pay cp, parasite bp from the co-player.
(14)
The interaction matrices determined by altruists and free-riders, and by free-riders and parasites
(a) C D
C (altruist) ba − ca −ca
D (free-rider) ba 0
(b) C D
C (free-rider) 0 −bp
D (parasite) bp − cp −cp
(15)
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determine a PD according to equation (13) whenever
bi > ci > 0 (16)
Although in recent years some evolutionary game theorists have carried out work on the study of coop-
eration using generic payoffs T,R, P, S, most work on the evolution of cooperation has focused on the study
of altruists versus free-riders. Specifically, most mechanisms found for the evolution of cooperation refer to
the evolution of altruism. Thus, we may ask ourselves if this rules work in the free-rider versus parasite
case.
3.4. Mechanisms promoting cooperation in the altruist versus free-rider dilemma
The study of the PD has led to the discovery of a set of mechanisms allowing for the survival and expansion
of altruism [74, 75], which might be classified in two groups: structural and behavioural mechanisms. These
mechanisms usually apply with no (or slight) change to the public goods game (PGG) as the N-players
generalization of the PD –note however than in a usual PGG cooperative individuals get self-benefits, which
does not happen in the PD.
At this point it is important to remark that all the mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation rely on the
same basic property: assortment. If the assortment between cooperative individuals is high enough, i.e. the
number of cooperator-cooperator interactions is high enough as to ensure that the benefits of cooperation are
higher for cooperators than for defectors, then cooperation is favoured by the natural selection process and
has higher chances to take over the entire population than defection (see [19] for a discussion of assortment
in PGG’s).
Structural mechanisms ensuring high enough levels of assortment rely on the existence of some factor
which does not depend directly on the behaviour of the individuals, and which roots on spatio-temporal or
matter-energy factors. This mechanisms include:
• kin selection [15, 16, 76], which allows for the evolution of cooperation whenever altruistic behaviours
are linked to genes, as explained in the introduction.
• network structures, as space or interaction networks, which depending on the properties of the network
may allow for the evolution of cooperation both for prisoner’s dilemmas [77–81] and public goods games
[67, 82].
• multilevel or group selection [43, 83], which happens whenever there are groups of individuals, the
individuals interact according to a prisoner’s dilemma only with individuals of their group, and there
is also competition and selection (birth-death process) at the group level. In some situations this
allows for cooperation to thrive [83].
• green-beards [84–87], which happens when the altruistic behaviour is genetically coded and preferen-
tially directed towards individuals carrying the altruistic trait. The green-beard effect has been found
in nature [87], where green beard–like genes code for cell adhesion [85, 87, 88].
• linking payoffs to ecological variables, which has been proven to allow for the evolution of cooperation in
the competition for oviposition sites in insects [89], and in general situations in which a limiting resource
constrains the replication and interaction capacity of the individuals [90–93]. Including mobility and
variable quality of habitats has also been proven to increase assortment as to allow for the evolution of
altruism [94, 95]. Finally, ecological dynamics including variable population sizes have been recently
studied in a PGG [96–100] showing that it allows for cooperation to thrive; however, this mechanism
fails for the PD [96].
In addition to the previous mechanisms, it is worth to analyse the case of weak altruism. In the PGG, as the
benefits created by cooperative individuals are redistributed within the entire interaction group, cooperative
individuals get a self-benefit for their own cooperative action. This makes cooperative individuals perceive
always an extra cooperator (itself) in their environment. In the case in which the self-benefit of cooperation
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is enough as to compensate the cost paid, the structure of random interactions allows for the evolution
of altruism in well-mixed populations. However, as individuals are not really experiencing any net cost
–although they still increase the other players’ fitness more than theirs– this case is usually called weak
altruism (See [19, 53] for nice reviews). Furthermore, this case cannot be mapped into an altruist vs. free-
rider PD whenever interaction groups consist of two individuals, as in the PD altruists experience a net cost
(see section 2 in [66] for a nice explanation), being thus the case of weak altruism less restrictive than the
PD, which corresponds to strong altruism (note that weak altruism corresponds to selfish cooperation, as
shown in Fig.1.
Behavioural mechanisms imply the addition of new behavioural types, which may require the use of
higher cognitive abilities, as memory or recognition capacity. Behavioural mechanisms found to promote
altruism in a well-mixed prisoner’s dilemma, where every individual interacts with any other, include
• reciprocity [45, 57, 58, 101, 102] –direct [58], indirect[101] and generalized [103, 104]–, where individ-
uals choose to cooperate or not according to some previous information about previous interactions,
as for instance if the co-player cooperated with you previously (direct reciprocity [45, 58, 102]), if he
cooperated previously with others (indirect reciprocity [101, 102]), or if there were previous coopera-
tive interactions in the group [103, 104]. The most famous example of a behaviour that allows for the
evolution of altruism through direct reciprocity is Tit For Tat, a strategy which cooperates the first
time it interacts with someone, and then it simply imitates the behaviour displayed by the co-player
in their last interaction together. This very simple behaviour turned out to be the surprising winner
of a series of computer tournaments [58], showing that one time step memory is enough to promote
cooperation whenever the game is an iterated prisoner’s dilemma, i.e. played repeatedly between the
same two players for many rounds.
• punishment and reward [105–115], when altruistic individuals may choose to pay some extra cost in
order to punish (impose a cost on) a free-rider partner with whom they interacted, or to reward other
altruistic individuals. Although the relative importance of both mechanisms is debated, it is generally
accepted that they are able to increase cooperation levels.
• similarity donation, which happens whenever individuals choose to cooperate if they find a certain level
of similarity between them and their interaction partners [116–121]. This mechanism is similar to a non-
genetically determined green beard, explained above. If there is a strong enough positive correlation
between altruistic behaviours and phenotype (observable characteristic) altruism is favoured by the
evolutionary process and will increase.
In addition to reward and punishment, behavioural mechanisms promoting cooperation in the public goods
game (PGG) include
• loner strategies [122–124], which do not play the public goods game and get some benefit on their own.
The inclusion of loners in addition to cooperators and defectors allows for neutrally stable cycles in the
absence of mutations, and for stable coexistence with cooperative and defective individuals whenever
mutations between strategies happen.
• destructive strategies [65, 125], termed Jokers, i.e. individuals who do not play the game and damage
any public goods game participant. This behaviour allows for robust evolutionary cycles of cooperation,
defection and destruction, even in the presence of mutations.
All previous mechanisms enable the evolution of altruism, either promoting the invasion of the entire
population by altruistic individuals, or allowing for their survival in a coexistence state with free-riders.
In the biological literature mechanisms are often classified in a different way, taking into account the
fact that individuals possess the ability to manage many of the previous mechanisms inherently, by their
own inherited capacities and structural form. In this way, the basic mechanisms are usually listed as kin
discrimination ([15, 16]), population viscosity (also called limited dispersal, [15, 16]), enforcing mechanisms
(including the conditional behaviours above) and group augmentation ([126]). This classification is in my
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opinion complementary to the one given above. While the first tries to disentangle the effect of each particual
feature that we find in nature, the latter classification already puts together the pieces which are found in
animal species, as for limited dispersal, which accounts for spatial structure and mobility of individuals. For
nice reviews from the biological perspective read [48, 75, 127].
3.5. Mechanisms promoting cooperation in the parasite versus free-rider dilemma
The mechanisms of kin selection, multilevel selection, network structures and reciprocity require for the
evolution of altruism in populations of altruists and free-riders [74] that
q > ca/ba (17)
where q is a constant related to the mechanism. For direct reciprocity q is the probability of playing a next
round with the same player, for indirect reciprocity it is the probability of knowing the reputation of the
other individual, and for kin selection q = r is the genetic relatedness.
Whenever equation (17) is fulfilled cooperation is –at least– evolutionary stable[74, 128], i.e. altruists
resist invasion attempts by free-riders, but, do the mechanisms for the evolution of altruism work for the
evolution of non-aggressive societies, i.e. the free-rider versus parasite case? In order to answer to this
question note that, if the evolutionary dynamics of two situations are identical, the dynamical result must
be the same. In appendix Appendix A the conditions for such dynamical equality are derived for the case
in which the evolutionary dynamics depends either on the difference between individual payoffs, or between
individual and mean population payoffs, which applied to the altruist versus free-rider and free-rider versus
parasite cases (equations (15)) result in
ba = bp (18)
k = ∆ba = cp. (19)
where ∆ba = ba − ca.
Using the previous equations, we may rewrite equation (17) in terms of the parameters referring to the
parasite versus free-rider case. Then, the mechanisms for the evolution of non-aggressive free-riding societies
in which individuals have the temptation to parasite other individuals require
q > 1− cp/bp. (20)
Thus, cooperation is enhanced whenever the costs for defecting increase or its benefits decrease.
Mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation based on structural properties –group selection, kin selection,
network reciprocity– work for the free-rider–parasite dilemma without modification. However, some of the
mechanisms for the promotion of altruism require conditional behaviours, i.e. altruists may decide not to
pay the cost in relation to some previous information about the co-player, and thus yield no benefit to
the free-riders. For reciprocity mechanisms to work in the “parasite dilemma”, when the active individual
carrying out the action, and thus paying the cost, is the parasite, free-riders would have to act as a parasite
when interacting with such individuals. This would increase the assortment between free-riders [18, 19, 129],
giving them the opportunity to enjoy a non-competitive environment, and reject parasites in it. It seems
thus plausible that punishment directed towards parasites, which might be seen as reciprocating a parasitic
act, evolved in nature parallel to emerging conflict-avoiding animal groups or societies. Indeed, it has been
observed in nature that punishment of thieves (parasites) happens much more frequent than punishment
directed towards lazy but non-aggressive individuals [56].
Note also that equation (19) requires k to equal the synergistic benefit ∆bs produced by the altruistic
action, and the cost of the selfish act. This excludes the possibility of having the same situation in the
altruist and parasite cases if k = 0, as according to equation (16) cp > 0. Thus, even if the dynamics are
identical, they are fundamentally different, one representing social goods formed by restraining from conflict,
i.e. not decreasing other individuals fitness (free-riders versus parasite), and the second representing goods
formed by cooperation (altruist versus free-riders), which increase the mean population fitness.
Every time altruists interact, they produce a benefit which is bigger than the cost paid, i.e. create a
positive synergistic benefit. However, two parasites interacting together create a net cost, i.e. a negative
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synergy. In order to have the same evolutionary dynamics in both cases, the negative synergistic effect has
to be compensated with a higher baseline fitness (equation (19)). This suggests that, although in a PD
cooperators always do worst than defectors, populations of altruists (active cooperators), might have some
advantage over parasites (active defectors) due to the fact that the first create positive synergistic effects
while parasites create a negative synergy.
As I show in the next section, in well-mixed populations of altruists, free-riders, and parasites, the
combination between the first two allows for their survival in higher levels than predicted by the mutation
terms, providing a first step towards the emergence of cooperation.
3.6. Generalised prisoner’s dilemma: Altruist–free-riding assortment to survive parasitism
The altruist and parasite strategies are defined in reference to a passive or neutral one, called free-rider.
The generalised PD matrix including interactions between the three strategies is in this case
Altruist Neutral Parasite
Altruist ba − ca −ca −bp − ca
Neutral ba 0 −bp
Parasite ba + bp − cp bp − cp −cp
(21)
Note that any two strategies in this matrix determine a PD if bi > ci > 0.
In any mixed population of two strategies determining a PD, defectors perform better than cooperators,
i.e. have higher fitness, and thus the final population will consist only of defective individuals. Let us see
what happens when the three strategies are mixed in the population. For this purpose I will assume that
the replicator dynamics hold, i.e. the variation of xi, the fraction of i individuals in the population, follows
the equation (let’s recall it from Eq. (3)),
dxi
dt
= x˙i = xi(fi − f) (22)
where fi is the payoff of strategy i and f is the mean population payoff.
The payoffs for altruists, free-riders (neutral individuals) and parasites in a well-mixed population with
proportions of individuals xi, i = a, n or p, are
fa = 1− s+ s[xaba − xpbp − ca]
fn = 1− s+ s[xaba − xpbp]
fp = 1− s+ s[xa(ba + bp) + xnbp − cp].
(23)
where the selection strength s accounts for the relative effect of the interactions on the fitness of individuals
(for s = 0 the game is irrelevant; for s = 1 the game determines the entire fitness [47]).
As xa + xn + xp = 1, we can describe the system dynamics with two replicator equations. We will use
those for altruists and parasites. The replicator equations are
x˙a = sxa[(baxa − cp)xp − (1− xa)ca],
x˙p = sxp[xa(ca + ba(xp − 1)) + cp(xp − 1)− bp(xa + xp − 1)],
(24)
and the rest points (xa, xp) for such dynamics are (0,0), (0,1), (1,0), corresponding to homogeneous popula-
tions of one of the strategies. However, as it can be observed in Fig. 2, the dynamics leads to populations of
parasites, the most selfish and less cooperative strategy, whenever the initial conditions include individuals
of all types. Note that the selection strength only introduces a time scale change to the previous equations.
However, for the replicator dynamics with mutations studied below, such selection strength is mandatory in
order to ensure positive payoffs.
The situation in which cooperation extinguishes changes drastically if mutations appear. In order to
introduce mutations into the system the replicator-mutator equation will be used [131]. Note however that
introducing a mutation term of the form µ(1− 3xi) in Eqs.24 returns similar results –this is the usual choice
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Figure 2: Replicator dynamics in well-mixed populations (mean field limit) of altruists (A), free-riders (N) and parasites (P)
without mutations. The simplex represents the fractions of individuals in the population; it shows the xa + xn + xp = 1 plane
in the three dimensional space determined by the fractions of strategies: The corners represent homogeneous populations of
the corresponding behaviour, while any other point represents mixed states. Colours correspond to different speeds dxi/dt:
red for the fastest, blue for the slowest. The evolutionary dynamics leads to homogeneous populations of parasites, the
dominant strategy, where the fitness of any individual is −cp < 0. This represents the worst possible outcome, as homogeneous
populations of free-riders possess null fitness, and populations of altruists have a positive fitness equal to ba − ca > 0 (note
that these quantities might be seen as variations of a baseline fitness). Parameters: Altruist and parasite benefits ba = bp = 2
and costs ca = cp = 1; selection strength s = 1. Images obtained using a modified version of the Dynamo Package [130].
19
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Figure 3: Replicator-mutator 25 dynamics in well-mixed populations of altruists (A), free-riders (N) and parasites (P). Unex-
pectedly, altruist and free-rider individuals survive in higher proportions than expected by the mutation rate. Increasing the
mutation rate increases the fractions of altruists and free-riders in the fixed point, as shown in (a)-(c). Decreasing altruists
costs and increasing parasites costs favours altruism, as shown in (d)-(f), which have all other parameters equal to (a) to allow
for a comparison. Parameters: ba = bp = 2, s = 1/(1 + ca + bp), maximum selection strength which ensures non-negative
payoffs, (a)-(c) ca = cp = 1, (a) µ = 0.05, (b) µ = 0.15, (c) µ = 0.45; (d)-(f) µ = 0.05, (d) ca = 0.05, cp = 1, (e) ca = 1,
cp = 1.95, (f) ca = 0.05, cp = 1.95.
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in cultural reproduction, while the replicator-mutator equation usually refers to genetic reproduction. The
replicator mutator equation is
x˙i =
∑
j=1
nxjfj(x)qij − xif¯ (25)
where xi is the fraction of i individuals in the population, qij is the transitions (mutation) matrix, containing
the probabilities that replication of state i gives rise to j, fj(x) is the fitness of strategy j, which depends
on the population composition, and f¯ is the mean population fitness. In this case payoffs are necessarily
positive –which can be tuned via the selection strength– as they relate directly with the number of offspring
produced instead of with frequency changes (as in cultural reproduction), which cannot be negative.
It has already been reported that, for public goods games, high mutation rates allowing for an exploration
of available strategies may promote cooperation [132], specially in the presence of punishing and loner
strategies. However, for low mutation rates and two strategies, cooperators and defectors, the promotion
of cooperation is only due to mutations and in a fraction µ/2 (in general, the promotion due to mutations
is µ/n, where n is the number of strategies). In the case of a generalised prisoner’s dilemma with three
strategies, altruists, free-riders and parasites, if the cost associated with altruism is not too big, and the one
associated with parasitism is big, the dynamics leads to coexistence of the three strategies, with fractions
of altruists, free-riders and parasites approaching 1/3 for high mutation rates (Fig. 3(c)) or extreme costs
(ba ≫ ca, bp ≈ cp, Fig. 3(f)). Hence, the combination of free-riders and altruists allows for an increase of
cooperative levels in the presence of parasites.
As argued before, the coexistence found cannot be explained by the mutation term alone; the presence
of altruist and free-rider individuals allows for both of them to survive to the invasion of parasites, which
does not happen whenever any of such strategies is mixed only with parasites. This result resembles the
speciation transitions found in other models (not PD’s), where evolution leads to coexistence of individuals
differing in their cooperativeness levels [133, 134], and the effect of damaging behaviours in the promotion of
cooperation [65, 125]. Thus, although free-riders lead altruism to extinction, and parasites lead free-riders
or altruists to extinction, the presence of both free-riders and altruists together provides an escape from the
worst of the tragedies of the commons, i.e. populations where all individuals are parasites decreasing the
fitness of any other individual, and where the mean population fitness decreases to its minimum value below
zero.
4. Competition in a world with limited resources
We live in a world with finite resources. Such limitation, as already pointed out by Darwin and Malthus,
triggers competition between individuals. Most evolutionary game theoretical models do not take this
limitation of resources into account further away than assuming a constant population size. However, such
limitation or resources is responsible for the tension between metabolic pathways, as well as may have played
an active role in the evolutionary transitions and formation of higher selective units.
In this section it is first analysed the kind of structure determined by trade-offs between rate and yield in
resources use, which have been suggested to be responsible for the transition to multicellularity. Then, the
competitive exclusion principle is explained, and all previous results presented in this review are analysed
by means of such principle. To finish, it is shown that a self-organizing process between resources use
and population composition allows for coexistence of cooperation and defection in the first example (to my
knowledge) of an exception to the competitive exclusion principle.
4.1. Rate versus yield trade-off: Prisoner’s dilemmas, harmony games and stag hunt games.
Trade-offs between rate and yield in resources use happen in bacterial and yeast species in which different
metabolic pathways allow them to process glucose by using fermentation and/or respiration. These trade-
offs have been proposed to have triggered multicellularity by cell adhesion of cooperative traits [135–137].
Let us now analyse which kind of interactions structure appears whenever the two different strategies using
resources, rate maximizers and yield maximizers, interact.
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Rate maximizer strategies maximize the production of new individuals per unit time, e.g. the production
of biomass used for reproduction per unit time. Yield maximizers are individuals which maximize the
production of new individuals per unit resource consumed. Let us suppose that there is an influx of resources
r0 into the system which is completely depleted by one of the strategies in order to reproduce. A rate
maximizer is able to effectively use an amount rr of such resources to reproduce, resulting in nr new
individuals in a time tr; a yield maximizer uses an amount ry of resources in a time ty in order to produce
ny new individuals. Let us finally assume that the cost of producing a new individual is
k =
rx
nx
(26)
where k is a proportionality constant between used resources and number of individuals produced and x
corresponds to either yield y or rate r maximizer strategies. Thus, the amount of wasted resources, which
will be assumed not viable to be used for further reproduction, is
wx = r0 − rx (27)
being wr > wy , as rate maximizers use resources faster at a higher waste production rate.
The trade-off between rate and yield maximizers can thus be captured by the following inequalities
ny > nr
ny
ty
< nr
tr
(28)
representing the first one the higher efficiency of yield maximizers, the second the faster reproduction of rate
maximizers when using r0 resources (this is easily proved using Eqs. 26 and 27). Note that this also implies
not only that the time that it takes for yield maximizers to deplete the amount or resources is bigger than
that of rate maximizers, i.e. ty > tr, but that it has to be at least bigger in a factor proportional to the
ratio of the numbers of new yield maximizers to new rate maximizers, i.e. ty > (ny/nr)tr.
Now, suppose that there are two individuals for which there are 2r0 resources available. If those two
individuals are both rate or yield maximizers, the number of new individuals produced will be the double
of those produced by just one individual, i.e. 2nx, in a time tx, producing also a double amount of wasted
resources; the per-capita numbers remain unchanged. What happens if the two individuals follow different
strategies?
The total resources consumption speed is vx = r0/tx with x = y, r for rate and yield maximizers
respectively. Whenever there is an amount of resources 2r0 to be shared by a rate and a yield maximizer,
the total consumption speed will be vT = vy + vr, and the consumption time can be obtained tc = 2r0/vT ,
which after a few calculations results in
tc =
2tytr
ty + tr
(29)
The amount of resource used by each individual will be r′x = vxtc, which may be rewritten as
r′x = 2r0fx (30)
where the fractions of resources used by each individual are
fy =
tr
ty+tr
fr =
ty
ty+tr
(31)
both fractions adding up to unity, fy + fr = 1, as expected. The number of new individuals produced by
each strategy will be n′x = 2fxnx and n
′
y = 2fyny, and if we assume that the payoff (as a measure of fitness)
of a strategy is proportional to the number of new individuals, we can write the following payoff matrix:
Y R
Y R = ny S = 2fyny
R T = 2frnr P = nr
(32)
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Figure 4: Non-cooperative games determined by the rate versus yield trade-off. (a) The three kinds of games determined by
rate versus yield trade-offs are shown as a function of the time ratio τ and number of offspring ratio ν, where the trade-off
condition imposes τ > ν > 1. (b) The unstable fixed point x∗ corresponding to the replicator dynamics for a fixed τ = 2 is
shown. For small ν we have a prisoner’s dilemma and cooperators (yield maximizers) extinguish irrespective of their initial
frequency; for medium ν values the interactions follow a Stag Hunt structure and cooperation extinguishes or takes over the
entire population if their initial frequency is below or above x∗ respectively; for big ν values the interactions determine a
Harmony game and defection (rate maximization) extinguishes.
The interaction matrix given by Eq. 32 contains the information about the system, and its analysis will
tell us which kind of interactions happen in the rate versus yield maximization problem. First, following
Eq. 28 it is straightforward that R > P . Furthermore, as fr > 1/2 > fy, it follows that T > P and R > S.
We are just left proving that T > S in order to prove that the rate versus yield interactions always determine
non-cooperative games, as defined in section 2.2. From the definition of both terms in Eq. 32 it follows that
T > S is equivalent to fr/fy > ny/nr. Using the definition of fx given in Eq. 31 we find that this happens
whenever ty/tr > ny/nr, which is always true, as it is one of the conditions for the trade-off between rate and
yield maximization expressed in Eq. 28. Hence, T,R > P, S, and the rate versus yield trade-off determines
always a non-cooperative game.
We may now ask ourselves which region of the parameters space corresponds to each game, i.e. to the
prisoner’s dilemma, snowdrift, stag hunt and harmony games, as defined in section 2.2. The boundary
between regions is determined by the lines resulting from T = R and P = S. For the first boundary, T = R,
from the definitions of T and R we get 2frnr = ny. If we define
τ = ty/tr
ν = ny/nr
(33)
where τ > ν > 1 (see Eqs. 28), we obtain the boundary condition:
T = R→ ν(τ + 1)− 2τ = 0 (34)
The boundary P = S is equivalent to 2fyny = nr, which is the same as the one in the paragraph before,
but with the substitution r ↔ y, and thus, according to Eq. 33, τ → τ−1 and ν → ν−1 in Eq. 34, resulting
in:
P = S → τ − 2ν + 1 = 0 (35)
again with τ > ν > 1. As shown in Fig. 4, three different regions appear for the rate versus yield trade-off:
a prisoner’s dilemma, a stag hunt game and a harmony game. For a fixed time ratio τ , the PD, SH and HG
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regions are found in order with increasing the number of offspring ratio ν. This means that there is a region
(PD) where yield maximizers (cooperation) extinguish if ν is small enough, a region of bi-stability where
either yield maximizers or rate maximizers extinguish depending on their initial frequencies for medium ν
values, and a third region where yield maximizers extinguish for big ν. This may be illustrated assuming
that the replicator dynamics drive the evolution of the system. For the replicator dynamics the unstable
fixed point in the stag hunt region takes the form
x∗ =
2ν − τ − 1
ν + τ − ντ − 1
(36)
which allows for the plot shown in Fig. 4(b), in which it can be observed the effect of increasing ν for fixed
τ , and the appearance of the three different regions.
Note that the situation just described, and whose essence is captured by the payoff matrix given in
Eq. 32, refers to interactions which are mediated by the environment, and not to direct interactions, as
individuals are not exchanging resources, but taking them from the environment in a way which affects the
co-player. Indeed, if one tries to impose the equal gains from switching condition, i.e. T − R = P − S,
which happens for direct interactions and payoff additivity, as assumed in the section 3.1, one obtains the
condition ν = 1, which is opposed to the condition ν > 1 for an environmentally mediated rate versus yield
trade-off. Indeed, the intersection point of Eqs. 34 and 35, the lines separating the three regions, happens
for ν = 1, where the SH region disappears and only HG’s and PD’s exist, as for additive payoffs and direct
interactions.
4.1.1. Weak rate versus yield trade-off
It is interesting to take into account what happens whenever the competition between rate and yield
maximizers is weak, i.e. when the two strategies diverge, but not too much [47]. It has been argued previously
that mutations do not usually lead to big evolutionary changes all at once, but that the evolutionary process
is actually a process in which the accumulation of many small mutations drives the subsequent observable
effects. Thus, we may take into consideration what happens whenever there is a stable population and a
random mutation drives the appearance of a new behaviour which determines a rate versus yield trade-off,
but which differs only slightly from the main behaviour in the population, i.e. whose ν and τ values approach
one.
Whenever the new strategy is only slightly different from the main behaviour, the stag hunt region
reduces and practically disappears, as it can be observed in Fig. 5. Thus, new mutants will be selected
for or disappear irrespective of the frequencies at which they appear: if the new mutant strategy is a yield
maximizer (cooperator) and determines a harmony game, it will be selected for and invade the population,
whereas if it determines a prisoner’s dilemma, it will be counter selected and will disappear; if the new
mutant strategy is a rate maximizer (defector), the same will happen to it, but being selected for if it
determines a PD, counter selected otherwise. Thus, the appearance of the stag Hunt region for the rate
versus yield trade-off, which was not present for direct interactions between individuals (see section 3.1),
may be considered negligible in real situations where the weak selection limit may be assumed, being again
the prisoner’s dilemma and the harmony game the major situations, as for the case of direct interactions.
4.2. The competitive exclusion principle
The competitive exclusion principle, also called Gause’s principle, was first discussed by G.F. Gause in
1934 [138] regarding previous works of Lotka and Volterra, and made famous by Hardin some decades later
[72], who stated it in its maxim form: “complete competitors cannot coexist”. The competitive exclusion
principle thus states that, whenever there are two species occupying the same ecological niche, e.g. using
the same resources, and living in the same area, even the slightest difference in reproductive rates will lead
one of the species to extinction. In game theoretical terms this is equivalent to individuals playing prisoner’s
dilemmas, harmony games and stag hunt games in well-mixed populations, where coexistence is not possible,
and evolution leads to the survival of only one species or behaviour.
As we have seen in section 3.1, whenever there are direct interactions between individuals, the principle
is true, as only prisoner’s dilemmas and harmony games happen in that case, and therefore whenever there
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Figure 5: Non-cooperative games determined by the rate versus yield trade-offs in the weak selection limit. (a) The three kinds
of games determined by rate versus yield trade-offs are shown as a function of the time ratio τ and the number of offspring
ratio ν, where the trade-off condition imposes τ > ν > 1. As it can be observed, in the weak selection limit the Stag Hunt
region reduces, and the games occupying most of the parameters space are the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Harmony Game, as
for the case of direct interactions between individuals. (b) The relative amplitud in ∆ν units occupied by each game is shown
as a function of the time ratio τ . As it can be observed, for the weak selection limit shown here, the predominant games are
the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Harmony Game.
are two kinds of behaviours, one of them is led to extinction. It was also shown in section 3.6 that the
interplay between three different behaviours and mutations allows for coexistence of the three species in
higher levels than predicted by the mutation term. Note however that this does not represent an exception
to the competitive exclusion principle, as mutations between different behaviours happen, and thus they do
not represent different species, but different behavioural types of the same species.
In section 4.1 it was shown that trade-offs between rate and yield in resources use determine prisoner’s
dilemmas, stag hunt games and harmony games in well-mixed situations. In this case again, irrespective of
the region in the parameters space where the system lies, the game structure does not allow for stable coex-
istence between strategies, and thus the competitive exclusion principle works, leading one of the behaviours
to extinction. However, some recent studies have shown that a certain type of self-organizing process which
roots on a feedback between resources and population composition, may allow for stable coexistence of
two strategies in the case of direct interactions in well-mixed populations, and in the absence of mutations
[65, 91, 92], being a theoretical example of a situation where the competitive exclusion principle does not
work. These results, are reviewed in the next section.
4.3. An exception to the competitive exclusion principle: An internal self-organizing process allowing for
coexistence of cooperators and defectors.
In words of Hardin [139] “The “truth” of the –competitive exclusion– principle is and can be established
only by theory, not being subject to proof or disproof by facts, as ordinarily understood”. With these words,
he referred to the fact that, even if an experimental setting is designed and used to prove that during a
certain period of time there is coexistence between two species occupying the same ecological niche, and
living in the same area, it is not possible to assure that the competitive exclusion principle is not at work,
as coexistence may just be a transitive effect, and extinction of one of the species may happen if longer
experiments are carried out. And as we do not have infinite time to carry out experiments, the validity of
the competitive exclusion principle cannot be disproved experimentally. However, he left a door open to
25
prove it wrong theoretically. In what follows I review theoretical and numerical evidence of what may be
regarded as an exception to the competitive exclusion principle.
Recent studies have presented extensions to the mathematical framework of evolutionary game theory in
order to study the effect of a limited amount of resources on the evolution of cooperation, using the parasite
versus free-rider problem as model of study. In these models, in addition to the frequency dependent
selection, a dependence on available resources has been introduced [65, 90–92]. The models assume that the
interactions between individuals are direct and payoffs additive, and that the population is in the mean field
limit, i.e. well-mixed. As shown in section 3, this kind of interactions lead only to prisoner’s dilemmas and
harmony games. However, the models present a situation in which payoffs are non-constant, but depend on
available resources.
In these models there is an influx of resources which is equally distributed between individuals. Such
resources are necessary for reproduction, but may also be used in order to carry out parasitic acts on the
co-player. The payoff matrix resulting from the interactions between individuals, written using the notation
of the present review, is
Y R
Y 0 −pb′p
R p(b′p − cp) −pcp
(37)
where the term 1 ≥ p > 0 accounts for the constrained capacity of parasites to carry out parasitic actions
depending on the amount of resources they possess (note that it cannot be null as there is an influx of
resources), and the term b′p ≤ bp accounts for the fact that the receiver of the parasitic action may have lower
resources than the maximum a parasite is able to take from the co-player (as before, cp is the parasitic cost).
This matrix may be rewritten without changing the dynamics (using the properties proven in section 2.3.1)
as
Y R
Y 0 a = −p(b′p − cp)
R b = p(b′p − cp) 0
(38)
As p > 0, and thus the matrix cannot become a null matrix due to this term, the situation is analogous to
that studied in section 3.1 whenever b′p − cp 6= 0, and only PD and HG structures happen in this case. If
b′p − cp = 0, then neutral stability may be attained.
Extensive agent based simulations have been carried out [90, 91] studying two cases: a first one where
resources are necessary for reproduction and for survival of the individuals (a certain dissipation of resources
is assumed for alive individuals), and a second one where resources are not necessary for the survival of
the individuals and deaths occur at random at a rate f . The results showed that, whenever resources
are necessary for the survival of the individuals [90], two major regions appear, one in which cooperators
extinguish, and a second one where defectors extinguish, in accordance to the expected outcome for direct
interactions in PD’s and HG’s regions (Fig. 6). However, things change when resources are only necessary
for reproduction.
If deaths occur at random independently of the species (in the analytical treatment it is assumed that the
frequency of deaths is negligible compared to that of interactions, i.e. f → 0) and resources are just necessary
for reproducing and interacting, then the system undergoes a transition for some parameter values, which
allows for stable coexistence of the two species (Fig. 7). This effect, as discussed by Requejo and Camacho
[91], roots in a self-organizing process which makes the payoff matrix in Eq. 38 evolutionary neutral in the
coexistence state, which is, moreover, the attractor of the system. In terms of the replicator equation, a third
solution appears, triggered by the feedback between resources and population composition. Such feedback
may be assumed to root on the dependence of the benefit bp of the parasitic strategies on the fraction of
cooperative individuals in the population. Assuming as a first approximation a linear relationship, bp = αρ,
the replicator equation [91] takes the form
dρ
dt
= −ρ(1− ρ)p(b′p − cp) = pρ(1− ρ)(cp − αρ). (39)
which provides a stable coexistence solution whenever cp/α ∈ (0, 1) (Fig. 7).
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Figure 6: Evolutionary outcome of a population of replicating cooperators (free-riders) and defectors (parasites) when resources
are necessary for reproduction and survival. The grey scale represents the fraction of cooperative individuals at the end of the
evolutionary process as a function of the resources net benefit bp − cp and cost cp of the parasitic action, in units of r, the
amount of resources necessary for reproduction. The results show two major regions: in white, free-riders extinguish; in black,
cooperators extinguish. A dissipation of resources per individual and time step of (a) 0.2r and (b) 0.01r is assumed.
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Figure 7: Evolutionary outcome of a population of replicating cooperators (free-riders) and defectors (parasites) when resources
are necessary for reproduction. The grey scale represents the fraction of cooperative individuals at the end of the evolutionary
process as a function of the resources net benefit bp−cp and cost cp of the parasitic action, in units of r, the amount of resources
necessary for reproduction. The results show the appearance of regions of stable coexistence. (a) Analytical prediction using
simplifying assumptions (f → 0) as shown in [91]. (b) Results of agent based simulations for f = 0.01. (c) Phase diagram
showing the line where the payoff matrix lies, as well as three points: C, corresponding to harmony games, where cooperation
is the evolutionary outcome, D, corresponding to a prisoner’s dilemma where cooperation extinguishes, and N, corresponding
to the neutral matrix. The feedback between resources and population composition allows the system to self-organize for a
wide range of parameters (grey regions) and drive the system to point N, i.e. neutral stability.
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Figure 8: Effect of variable influxes of resources in the evolution of a population of cooperators and defectors with a mean
population size of N = 93 individuals. A sinus function rin = 4000 + 3500sin(2pit/w) is assumed to drive the average influx
of resources between t = 5000, and t = 10000 (some randomness is always allowed), with periods (a) w = 0, (b) w = 500,
(d) w = 1000 and (d) w = 2000. As it can be observed, the population size follows the same behaviour as the variable influx
of resources, while the effect on the fraction of cooperators seems to be an increase in noise, and transient promotions of
cooperation and defection while the population size decreases and increases, respectively (see Fig. 9).
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Figure 9: Effect of sudden increases and decreases in resource influx on the evolution of a system of cooperators and defectors in
a coexistence state. The temporal evolution of such a system is shown, starting in a coexistence state. At t = 5000 the amount
of resources is divided by 5, leading to a short transient in which the fraction of cooperators increases while the population
size is decreasing. At t = 10000 the amount of resources returns to its original value, which leads to a pronounced decrease in
cooperation during a short period of time, while the population size is increasing.
The stability of the system has also been tested in small populations introducing oscillating amounts of
incoming resources. As it can be observed in Fig. 8, the effect of a variable amount of resources does not
alter the coexistence state, its influence being only on the population size under study, which is proportional
to the amount of resources entering the system. Furthermore, sudden increases or decreases in the amount
of resources seem to produce only a transient effect on the coexistence state, being cooperation slightly
promoted while the system re-adapts to a sudden decrease in resources, and defection being promoted by
sudden increases of resources, as shown in Fig. 9. The last case, when resources suddenly increase, may
represent situations in which a new source of resources is found; as it is shown, new sources of resources
promote parasitism while the population size increases towards the new stable state.
4.3.1. Simplified analytical models and phase transitions in evolution
Simplified analytical models have been developed to describe analytically the effects observed in the
previous models [92, 93], which relied primarily on agent based simulations, and accounted for a continuum
range of resources which individuals possessed. The simplified models make similar assumptions as the
previous models, but assume that individuals do not posses an amount of resources belonging to a continuum,
and instead may or may not have resources. Furthermore, some new parameters are introduced in order
to allow for the analytical treatment. These parameters include –the rest of the parameters are explained
below– α, accounting for the fraction of effective interactions between defectors able to carry out parasitic
actions and other individuals, and q, the probability that a defector looses its resources as a consequence of
its behaviour, and which may be interpreted as the mean cost per interaction cp of the previous model. This
allows to write a set of differential equations which may be solved numerically [92, 93], and which show the
phase transitions that occur in the system. The models account for three situations: one where resources
are necessary for reproduction and survival, one where they are only necessary for survival and deaths occur
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Figure 10: Phase transitions when resources are necessary for survival. (a) Fractions of cooperators ρ, (solid line) and defectors
1− ρ (dashed line) as a function of parameter q = cp for α/r = 10, where α is the probability of acting of defectors in active
states and r the resources dissipation rate of individuals to keep alive. Two phase transitions happen, allowing for three
different regions: dominance of defection, coexistence and dominance of cooperation. (b) Phase diagram showing the regions
of defection and coexistence as a function of q and α/f .
at random, and a third one where resources are necessary for survival, deaths occur at random, and the
population size is constant.
The analysis of such models shows that whenever resources are necessary for reproduction and survival,
two phase transitions happen, the first one from a defective state to a coexistence state between cooperators
and defectors, the second from the coexistence state to dominance of cooperation. It has been proven [93]
that the population composition can be written in the simple form
Ci, Di = gi(q,
α
r
)
ET
r
, (40)
where Ci and Di are the fractions of cooperators and defectors with i resources, i = 0, 1, gi are functions
of the corresponding parameters, and ET /f is the quotient between total incoming resources ET and death
rate f , which sets the population size. Thus, the transitions towards cooperation depend on the parameters
α and q presented in the previous paragraph, as well as on r, the rate of dissipation of resources of alive
individuals. As it can be observed in Fig. 10, the region of coexistence is small compared to the regions of
dominance of each strategy, being cooperation dominant for high parasitic costs, q > 0.72, as calculated in
[93].
When resources are necessary only for reproduction and deaths occur at random at a rate f , a phase
transition happens from a fully defective population to coexistence states, as shown in Fig. 11. In this case
the population composition may be written as
Ci, Di = hi(q,
α
f
)
ET
f
, (41)
The transition depends on the parameters α and q, as well as on f , the death probability. As it can be
observed in Fig. 10, the region of coexistence increases with increasing the quotient α/f , i.e. with increasing
the mean lifetime number of interactions.
When resources are necessary only for reproduction and deaths occur at random, but at a rate which
maintains population size constant, a phase transition happens from a fully defective population to coexis-
tence states, as shown in Fig. 12. This transition depends on parameters β = α/γ and q, being γ the resource
income rate. Above the threshold parameters at which the transition happens, the population composition
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Figure 11: Phase transition to coexistence between cooperators and defectors when resources are not necessary for survival. (a)
Fractions of cooperators ρ, (solid line) and defectors 1− ρ (dashed line) as a function of parameter q = cp for α/f = 10, where
α is the action probability of defectors in active states and f the death rate. Below a critical value, cooperators extinguish.
(b) Phase diagram showing the regions of defection and coexistence as a function of q and α/r.
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Figure 12: Phase transition to coexistence between cooperators and defectors when resources are not necessary for survival
and population size is constant. (a) Fractions of cooperators ρ, (solid line) and defectors 1 − ρ (dashed line) as a function
of parameter cp for β = α/γ = 10, where α is the action probability of defectors in active states and γ the resource income
rate. Below a critical value, cooperators extinguish. (b) Phase diagram showing the regions of defection and coexistence as a
function of q and β.
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can be written as
Ci = ai(1−
βc
β
), D1 =
a2
β
, (42)
with i = 0, 1, and ai and βc functions of parameter q (note that, being the population size constant, D0 may
be computed from these quantities). Remarkably, in contrast with the situations in which the population
size varies and an increase in resources just changes the population size, but not the final outcome of the
system, in this case in which the population size is constant a decrease in resources income rate γ is enough
to trigger the transition to coexistence states between cooperators and defectors (see Fig. 12.
5. Conclusions
The evolutionary game theoretical framework has expanded greatly during the last decades, and the
study of the evolution of cooperation, a paradigmatic issue since the very beginning of the evolutionary
thinking, has reached contexts which where considered as science-fiction when it all began. The study of the
simple rules that allow for the promotion of cooperation has been superseded by new studies that include
some of the intricacies of an ecological and economical world in which feedbacks, synchronizations and
self-organizing processes give rise to unexpected behaviours. However, as it has been shown in the present
review, taking care of the simple concepts that triggered the development of the framework is still a source
of surprising results, as the fact that random exploration of strategies determining prisoner’s dilemmas
allows for the survival of all of them, or that the limitation of resources may trigger coexistence states in
a situation in which following the competitive exclusion principle one would say that it should not happen.
For this reason, and given the expanding complexity of the models, which include more and more details
of the great reality surrounding us, the present review went back to the beginning of the path: first, to the
history, the relevant concepts and their evolution, and then to the roots of the problem, the struggle for
life, and inherently to it, the struggle for resources. This last point seems specially important in a world in
which sources of resources which where assumed to be infinite during the industrial revolution are at risk of
becoming exhausted, and in which the atmosphere, the seas and all ecosystems, are starting to change due to
human behaviour. Although much more accurate models are necessary to represent such complex situations,
the present review presented some results that, though very simple, may allow for the development of such
models, and ultimately for a better understanding of the world we live in and the society we are creating.
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Appendix A. Reference strategies, dynamical equality and distinguishablity
If the evolutionary rule depends on the payoff difference between strategies, as it happens for some local
rules [63, 64], or between the strategy’s payoff and the mean population fitness, as for the replicator equation
[140], the dynamics is invariant under the addition of a constant to all payoffs (see Sec.2.3.1). Suppose now
that there are two different situations, one represented by payoff matrix Π, corresponding to equation (11),
32
the other one by Π′. We may add a constant k to the second one, and find the necessary conditions to have
equal dynamics, i.e. find the parameters that fulfil
Π = Π′ + k. (A.1)
By doing so, one finds
∆s = ∆
′
s
∆r = ∆
′
r
k = Ar −A
′
r +As −A
′
s
(A.2)
This conditions tell us when the dynamics of the two situations are indistinguishable given the previous
assumptions, and thus cannot be used to tell the difference between both scenarios. Note that if we are
dealing with direct interactions between individuals, which produce a fitness change in actor and recipient,
and fitness is additive, then equations (12), (13) must hold, which is consistent with equations (A.2).
Now, suppose that we are dealing with the more interesting case in which one of the strategies is present
in both situations, and might be used as reference to establish a relative scale of cooperativeness. If this
strategy is the cooperative one in both scenarios, then the only possibility that fulfils equations (A.2) is that
the defective strategy is also the same, and k = 0. Both situations are then not only indistinguishable by
looking to the dynamics, but the same indeed.
There is a more interesting case, however, when the strategy present in both scenarios is regarded as
defective in one case, as cooperative in the other, i.e. Bs = A
′
s, Br = A
′
r. In this case, this strategy may be
used as reference. Equations (A.2) reduce to
2Bs = As +B
′
s
2Br = Ar +B
′
r
k = ∆s +∆r > 0
(A.3)
The fact that k > 0 comes from the restrictions introduced in equation (13), both for PD and HG. This has
an important implication: Even if the dynamics of two situations are identical (given the assumptions above),
we may always measure a baseline fitness difference k to tell them apart. Furthermore, the equations tell us
the relationship between cooperativeness and selfishness degrees (∆r,∆s), and difference in mean population
fitness k.
It might not seem really surprising the fact that we can always find a difference when the systems are not
equal (even if the dynamics are indistinguishable). However, the fact that we may quantify such difference
measuring differences in baseline fitness, and relate it to higher or lower cooperativeness and selfishness of the
interactions between the different behaviours or species, allows us to define a relative scale for cooperation.
Appendix B. More on the definitions of cooperation and altruism
Appendix B.1. Definitions of cooperation and altruism along the literature
Some of the definitions in the literautre are summarised here.
• “The degree of co-operation observed in nature varies along a continuum, from the one extreme of
severe parasitism/virulence to the other extreme of mutual benevolence. [. . . ] An observed level of co-
operation requires evolutionary explanation only in so far as that level deviates from a level representing
the ”null” point for the species interaction, and calculation of this null point is somewhat subjective.
[. . . ] Our designation of a phenotype as cooperative need only imply that it is more co-operative than
some feasible alternative.” Bull and Rice, 1991 [51]
This definition refers to relative cooperation.
• “Cooperation is an outcome that –despite potential relative costs to the individual– is ”good” in some
appropriate sense for the members of a group, and whose achievement requires collection action. But
the phrase ”to cooperate” can be confusing, as it has two common usages. To cooperate can mean either:
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(1) to achieve cooperation–something the group does, or (2) to behave cooperatively, that is, to behave
in such a manner that renders the cooperation possible (something the individual does), even though
the cooperation may not actually be realised unless other group members also behave cooperatively.”
Dugatkin 1997 [52]
The difference between cooperative behaviour and cooperation is clear in this definition.
• “The key distinction we wish to make is between cooperation (an interaction between two or more indi-
viduals) and cooperative behaviour (an action or actions taken by a single individual). [. . . ] We define
cooperation as an interaction between individuals that results in net benefits for all of the individuals
involved” Bergmueller et al. 2007 [49]
This definition is slightly more restrictive than the one in the main text, though both overlap if one
accounts for peace as a social good or benefit.
• Referred to lifetime consequences: “Cooperation: A behaviour which provides a benefit to another
individual (recipient), and which is selected for because of its beneficial effect on the recipient” West
et al. 2007 [48]
This definition mixes cooperation, which is something carried out by at least two interacting individuals
(see the definition in reference [52] above), and cooperative behaviour, i.e. individual behaviour which
allows for cooperation.
• “- Cooperative behaviour: a behaviour that on average increases the fitness of a recipient and which
is under positive selection if it on average increases the inclusive fitness of the actor via direct fitness
benefits. [. . . ] - Altruistic behaviour: a behaviour that on average increases the fitness of a recipient
and which is under positive selection if it on average increases the inclusive fitness of the actor via
indirect fitness benefits. [. . . ] - Cooperation: two (n) partners increase on average their direct fitness
due to the interaction.” Brosnan and Bshary 2010 [55]
The first definition above accounts always for cooperative behaviours (behaviours that, when inter-
acting together, create direct fitness benefits for all interacting individuals). However, the above
definitions are blurry in some situations, as when behaviours are counter-selected, e.g. if an actor
provides a benefit to a recipient, and the inclusive fitness of the actor increases due to direct fitness
benefits, but less than the average increase in the population, it would be under negative selection,
and the above definition cannot be applied to call it cooperative or not. Furthermore, according to the
definitions altruistic behaviours are not considered cooperative, nor cooperative behaviours altruistic.
Appendix B.2. Remarks on the definitions in the text
The present review starts with the statement of a relative definition of cooperation and selfishness,
avoiding commentaries of whether cooperation is intentional or unintentional. The definition of cooperation
in this way includes by-product mutualism, situation which might be regarded as a case of unintentional
cooperation. Some authors have claimed that this is on the limit of the scope of cooperation [48, 51], and
that it is important to understand the emergence of stable ecosystems and other selective units [141] from
cooperative interactions, independently of their intentionality.
As an example, an elephant excreting dung is acting beneficially for itself, and for beetles feeding on
such dung. Some authors argued that such behaviour is out of the scope of cooperation, as the situation
is a one-way by-product benefit, and the elephant behaviour does not deviate from the behaviour found in
the absence of beetles, which in this case represents the null point [48, 51, 55]. However, it is known that
baby elephants eat other elephants dung in order to obtain some bacteria that feed on it, and which they
need to incorporate to their intestine in order to digest the vegetation present in the savannah and jungles.
According to the same reasoning, if an increase in dung leads to an increase of such bacteria, which in turn
allows elephants to produce more dung, this second situation might be classified as cooperative.
The provided definition explicitly states that cooperation must not be forced. Other authors require it
to be voluntary to prevent some exploitative or slaver behaviours and acts to be regarded as cooperative, as
food in exchange for work or forced starvation otherwise, which might be found in the sometimes wrongly-
classified as mutualistic interactions between ants and aphids, where ants take care of aphids as far as
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they provide them with food, but kill them otherwise. Requiring cooperation not to be forced allows for
coherence with this argument, as well as with those in the previous paragraphs for including non-intentional
behaviours.
Cooperative acts may also be carried out in big groups [52], where one action has many simultaneous
recipients. According to the definition, we might talk about cooperative acts of one individual directed to
another, as it might happen that the action of an individual has non-negative effects and negative effects on
different individuals at the same time; e.g. suppose the elephant dung falls on an ants nest and blocks the
entrance: The act would be cooperative for the beetles and bacteria using the dung, while non-cooperative
for the ants.
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